Introduction
On 25 August 2026, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Kavala v. Türkiye (No. 2) (Application no. 2170/24), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0825JUD000217024. The case concerns the prolonged deprivation of liberty, criminal conviction, and prosecution of the applicant in connection with the Gezi Park events in Türkiye.
The judgment addresses a wide range of Convention rights, including the right to liberty under Article 5, the right to a fair trial under Article 6, freedom of expression under Article 10, freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3, and the requirement that restrictions on Convention rights pursue only permitted purposes under Article 18. The Court also issued directions under Article 46 concerning the execution of the judgment.
This article summarises the principal findings of the Grand Chamber as they appear in the official judgment text. It does not offer individual legal advice, and readers with specific legal concerns should seek qualified professional assistance.
Background and admissibility: exhaustion of domestic remedies
A preliminary question before the Grand Chamber concerned whether the applicant had exhausted available domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the question arose whether the applicant was obliged to await the outcome of his individual application to the Constitutional Court before bringing his case to Strasbourg.
The Grand Chamber concluded that the applicant could not be criticised for failing to await that outcome. The Court found that the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court remedy was seriously compromised in the particular circumstances of the case. It noted the applicant's uninterrupted deprivation of liberty for eight and a half years, his consistent, diligent, and unambiguous use of all available domestic remedies without success, and the persistent failure to execute the binding judgments previously delivered by the European Court in Kavala v. Turkey and Kavala v. Türkiye (infringement proceedings) [GC].
The Court further observed that there had been manifestly excessive delays in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court concerning the applicant's two individual applications, and that the remedy in question presented no reasonable prospect of timely examination on account of the Constitutional Court's procedural inertia. The domestic acquittal judgment had also produced no practical effect. In these circumstances, the admissibility objection was dismissed.
Article 5: the right to liberty
The Grand Chamber examined the applicant's deprivation of liberty as a whole and found it incompatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. With respect to the pre-trial phase, the Court found that the detention was arbitrary, not based on reasonable grounds, and did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in the Convention.
Particularly significant was the Court's finding that the authorities had acted in bad faith, seeking alternative grounds to ensure the continuation of the applicant's detention and to circumvent the requirements of domestic law. This finding reflects a serious assessment of the conduct of the respondent State's authorities during the pre-trial period.
As regards the detention following the applicant's conviction, the Court found this to be unlawful under Article 5 § 1 (a). The detention was based on the execution of a sentence imposed at the close of proceedings in which there had been a flagrant denial of justice incompatible with the fundamental guarantees of a fair trial. The Grand Chamber concluded that the deprivation of liberty in question had no permissible legal basis under the Convention.
Article 6: the right to a fair trial
The Grand Chamber identified serious shortcomings in the criminal proceedings against the applicant that affected both the fairness of the proceedings and the guarantees of independence and impartiality of the courts, in violation of Article 6 § 1.
Among the specific deficiencies identified, the Court noted the lack of any analysis by the domestic courts of a causal link between the applicant's activities and the violence in question, despite the fact that the offence with which he was charged presupposed the use of force and violence. The Court also found that the defence's requests to hear key witnesses had been refused in a stereotyped manner, without adequate procedural counterbalancing or effective review on appeal or by the Court of Cassation.
The conviction was found to be based on largely contextual and insufficiently individualised inferences, which effectively placed the burden on the accused to refute them. The domestic courts had adopted an arbitrary and unforeseeable interpretation of criminal law to the applicant's detriment, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable outcome of the trial.
The Grand Chamber also identified converging elements likely to give rise to legitimate doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, including successive remittals of the case from one court to another. These elements were assessed in the light of the wider context of structural shortcomings affecting the independence of the judiciary in Türkiye. Taken together, the shortcomings were found to have fundamentally impaired the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial.
Articles 10 and 11: freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly
The Grand Chamber found violations of both Article 10 and Article 11 of the Convention, which protect freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly respectively. The applicant had been sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment for what the domestic courts characterised as a strategic role in the planning, coordination, or leadership of violent incidents during the Gezi Park events, without any examination of his actual involvement.
The Court observed that the conviction was based on acts directly linked to the applicant's activity as a human-rights defender and his involvement in the Gezi Park events. The domestic courts had equated lawful civil-society activities, which are protected by the Convention, with the material element of an exceptionally serious criminal offence.
The Court of Assize's interpretation of the Criminal Code had led to the indirect attribution of criminal liability for acts of violence committed by third parties, in the absence of any direct participation, incitement, or accommodation on the applicant's part. The Grand Chamber characterised this as a manifestly disproportionate criminal burden.
The Court further found that the interpretation in question was likely to have a particularly serious chilling effect on the exercise of the freedoms enshrined in Articles 10 and 11. Crucially, the extension of the scope of the criminal-law provision at issue had not afforded the requisite minimum protection against arbitrary interference and was therefore not 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of the Convention.
Article 3: inhuman or degrading punishment
The Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive dimension, concerning the prohibition of inhuman or degrading punishment. The violation arose from the sentencing of the applicant to aggravated life imprisonment without any prospect of release or review of the sentence to take account of changes in his personal situation or his level of dangerousness.
The Court held that this sentence was incompatible with Article 3 from the moment of its delivery, given its irreducible character. An irreducible life sentence — one that offers no mechanism for review or the possibility of release — is treated by the Court as raising a distinct and serious issue under Article 3, independent of the circumstances of the underlying offence.
Article 18: restrictions for purposes not prescribed by the Convention
The Grand Chamber also found a violation of Article 18 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 5 § 1, 6 § 1, 10, and 11. Article 18 prohibits the application of restrictions on Convention rights for purposes other than those for which they are prescribed.
The Court found that the prosecution of the applicant, his continued pre-trial detention, and his conviction were predominantly motivated by an ulterior purpose: namely, to punish him for his role in the Gezi Park demonstrations and for expressing his opinions as a human-rights defender, and to silence him. This finding of bad faith on the part of the respondent State's authorities represents one of the most serious conclusions available to the Court under the Convention framework.
Article 46: execution of the judgment and individual measures
Under Article 46 of the Convention, which concerns the binding force and execution of the Court's judgments, the Grand Chamber set out specific individual measures required of the respondent State. The Court held that Türkiye is required to secure the applicant's release at the earliest possible date.
In addition, the respondent State is required to eliminate the consequences of the impugned conviction, which the Court regarded, from the perspective of Convention law, as null and void. The State must also afford effective redress for the violations found.
These directions are notable in their specificity. The characterisation of the conviction as null and void from the perspective of Convention law, and the explicit requirement of release at the earliest possible date, reflect the Grand Chamber's assessment of the gravity and systemic nature of the violations identified throughout the judgment. The Court's directions under Article 46 are binding on the respondent State and are subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
Conclusion
The Grand Chamber's judgment in Kavala v. Türkiye (No. 2) represents a comprehensive assessment of multiple, overlapping violations of the European Convention on Human Rights arising from the applicant's prosecution, detention, and conviction. The Court found violations of Articles 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 18, and issued specific directions under Article 46 requiring the applicant's release and the elimination of the consequences of his conviction.
The judgment is significant for its findings on the exhaustion of domestic remedies in circumstances where a Constitutional Court remedy had been rendered ineffective by procedural inertia, on the indirect attribution of criminal liability for third-party violence, on the chilling effect of an overbroad criminal-law interpretation on civil-society activity, and on the characterisation of an irreducible life sentence as inhuman punishment from the moment of its delivery.
The case also continues a line of proceedings before the Court involving the same applicant, and the Grand Chamber's directions under Article 46 build upon the obligations already established in the earlier judgments referenced in the document. The execution of this judgment will be monitored by the Committee of Ministers in accordance with the Convention system.
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Sources consulted
- CASE OF KAVALA v. TÜRKİYE (No. 2) - European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe
Published by Synojus International
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